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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to identify the ways in which federal
actions can influence state regulatory choices in the context of
environmental policy. The federal government may directly
influence state policy choices by preempting state policies or by
inducing state cooperation through the use of various incentives
and penalties for state action. The federal government may
indirectly, and perhaps unintentionally, influence state policy
choices as well. Federal policies may encourage greater state
regulation by reducing the costs of initiating regulatory action or
by placing issues on state policy agendas. Federal regulation may
also discourage or even “crowd-out” state-level regulatory action
by reducing the net benefits of state-level initiatives. The potential
for federal regulation to have both positive and negative indirect
effects on state regulatory choices suggests that increases in federal
regulation can alternatively enhance or reduce state regulatory
activity and may, in some instances, even result in a net reduction
of regulatory protection for environmental resources. Such
potential effects are largely ignored in environmental policy
discussions, and warrant subsequent empirical study. While this
paper focuses on environmental regulation, the overall framework
should be applicable to other regulatory contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
Up until the 1970s, environmental protection largely
consisted of a patchwork of state laws, local ordinances and
common law nuisance protections.1 State and local governments
had begun to adopt various environmental measures in the 1960s.
Nonetheless, there was a general perception that state and local
governments were unable or unwilling to address most
environmental concerns.2 Congress responded with an array of
environmental statutes that reoriented the federal-state relationship
in environmental law.3 The federal government assumed the
dominant role in national policy-making. States continue their
environmental protection efforts, but they are largely
overshadowed by the federal government. 4
In recent years scholars have begun to reexamine the
federal-state balance in environmental law.5 New scholarship has
1

See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995).
2
See generally Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental
Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in Environmental Protection, 55
CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 93 (2004).
3
These statutes include the Clean Air Act (1970), the Clean Water Act (1972),
the Endangered Species Act (1973), the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (1975), the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (1976), and the Toxic Substances Control Act
(1976). The National Environmental Policy Act, enacted in 1969, was also an
important environmental statute, but it did not have as much of an impact on the
federal-state balance in environmental law.
4
See John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption:
Lessons from Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 205
(1997) (the role of states “is increasingly restricted to those areas not yet subject
to extensive federal regulation . . . and to the implementation and enforcement of
permits issued pursuant to federal standards and procedures”).
5
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation mOre
Adaptive Through Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U.KAN. L.
REV. 1377 (2005); DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM
WASHINGTON (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using
Federalism to Spur Environmental Innovation, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF
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challenged the necessity and effectiveness of much federal
environmental regulation, while others have defended the
preeminent role of federal environmental law. There remains
substantial disagreement on the extent to which states can be
trusted to adopt welfare-enhancing environmental safeguards.6
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 263-64 (Jim Chen ed., 2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 206 (2002); Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of
Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002); PIETRO S. NIVOLA &
JON A. SHIELDS, MANAGING GREEN MANDATES: LOCAL RIGORS OF U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies, 2001); Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of
Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 258-59
(2000); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 179-83 (1999); Richard
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critique, in
THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 105 (John Ferejohn &
Barry R. Weingast, eds. 1997); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and
Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV.
535, 536-37 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); HENRY BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING
FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); Percival, supra note
1; Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
‘Race to the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). Even analysts that are highly skeptical of the
benefits of granting states greater control over environmental policy decisions
acknowledge that some measure of decentralization is warranted. See, e.g.,
Esty; Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or
Reform?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11086 (2001).
6
For critiques of decentralization, see, e.g., Kirsten Engel and Susan RoseAckerman, Environmental Federalism in the United States: The Risks of
Devolution, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 137 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds.,
2001); Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 351 (2000); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Peter
P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J.
ON REG. 67 (1996).
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Some scholars fear that states would adopt suboptimally lax
environmental protections absent a sufficient federal regulatory
“floor.”7 This concern exists even where environmental problems
lack the sort of extraterritorial impacts that are likely to produce
insufficient environmental protection at the state and local level.8
Despite the extensive scholarly literature assessing the
proper role of federalism in environmental law, there has been
relatively little analysis of why states adopt given environmental
policies.9 There is even less consideration of how federal
regulatory choices influence state environmental policy, and how a
change in federal policy could influence states’ willingness to
adopt more environmental protections of their own. This article
seeks to address this gap by describing some of the factors that are
likely to influence state environmental policy decisions and
delineating how federal environmental policies can affect state
policy choices. Specifically, this article seeks to further the
understanding of how federal regulation influences the scope and
effectiveness of state regulations.

7

It is important to note that a suboptimal regulatory regime could either overregulate or under-regulate. In the environmental literature, however, there is a
greater concern that states will under-regulate absent active federal participation
in environmental protection.
8
For example, some commentators fear that interjurisdictional competition for
economic investment will produce a “race to the bottom” that leads to
systematic underprotection of environmental values. See, e.g., CLIFFORD
RECTHSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22–25 (2003) (the raceto-the-bottom theory is the “central underpinning” of federal environmental
regulation); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOME VOTER HYPOTHESIS 162 (2001)
(noting “a widespread belief that competition among jurisdictions poses a
danger of a mutually destructive ‘race to the bottom.’”); Esty, supra note 5, at
628 (“Fears of a welfare-reducing race to the bottom represent one of the central
underpinnings of federal environmental regulation in the United States”); Swire,
supra note 6; Engel, supra note 6.
9
See PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 8 (2004) (“state regulation is far
less well understood than federal regulation, though it is no less important”). In
this regard, the Teske volume is an important addition to the literature.
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Some of the factors that influence state regulatory decisions
are readily apparent, such as wealth, knowledge and interest-group
pressure. The influences of federal regulation on state regulatory
choices, particularly insofar as such influences are felt indirectly,
may be less obvious. Nonetheless, it should be evident that federal
policy decisions should have some effect on state policy choices
concerning the existence, scope, and contours of state regulatory
programs. These effects can occur whether intended or not. In
some instances, federal action may even preclude or discourage
welfare-enhancing initiatives at the state and local level.
This article suggests a framework for categorizing and
analyzing how federal policy decisions can influence state
regulatory choices. The federal influence can be both “positive” –
resulting in greater levels of state regulation – or “negative.”
Federal influence can also be direct or indirect. Direct influences
include federal preemption and the creation of various incentives
and penalties for state action or inaction, including conditional
preemption and conditional spending. Indirect influences may be
less obvious, but are no less important. Federal action – or perhaps
even federal inaction – can encourage greater state regulation by
reducing the costs of initiating regulatory action or by altering state
policy agendas. At the same time, federal regulation may
discourage states from adopting or maintaining more protective
environmental rules or even “crowd-out” state-level regulatory
action by reducing the net benefits of state-level initiatives.
Building on prior research and analysis of federalism in
environmental law and policy,10 this article further seeks to
10

See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and
the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005);
Adler, supra note 2; Adler, supra note 5; Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop
Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
205, 226 (2001); Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of
Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal
Wetland Regulation, 29 ENV. L. 1 (1999); Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The
Green Aspects of Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for
Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 573 (1998).
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reexamine some of the conventional assumptions that underpin
many discussions of the proper federal-state balance in
environmental policy. Among other things, this article suggests
that insufficient attention to the effects of federal action on state
policy choices can reduce the scope and effectiveness of
environmental protection efforts.
For example, if federal
regulatory action has the potential to discourage or “crowd out”
state regulatory efforts, the adoption of a federal regulatory “floor”
may actually lower instead of raise the aggregate level of
environmental protection in a given jurisdiction.11
Part I provides a brief overview of the development of
environmental regulation at the state and local level and identifies
some of the factors that influence state-level environmental
regulatory decisions. These factors help explain why governments
at any level choose to adopt environmental regulations and why
different states, left to their own devices, will adopt different
environmental policies. These factors vary over time as well. A
given state that is unlikely to adopt specific environmental
measures at one point may be more likely to adopt the same, or
even more extensive, measures at a later date.
This
“environmental transition” provides the context for understanding
how federal regulatory decisions can impact state regulatory
decisions over time. Identifying those economic and political
factors which are likely to influence state policy choices is also
necessary in order to isolate and evaluate the extent to which
federal policies affect state decisions.
Part II provides an introductory matrix and brief overview
of how federal regulatory decisions can directly influence state
regulatory decisions. This part explains that federal directives
commanding state regulatory action are constitutionally prohibited,
but federal prohibitions on state regulatory action are not. Further,
11

Cf. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 242 (2000) (federal “minimum
standard may raise the bar by establishing a baseline of protection” and
“foreclose the possibility of a race to the bottom or race to laxity”); Steinzor
supra note 6.

6

Adler – When Is Two A Crowd?

DRAFT – Not for Citation

the federal government retains substantial power to induce state
regulatory action through the provision of various penalties and
incentives, including the conditional use of preemption and the use
of conditional spending.
Part III turns to the indirect effects of federal regulation on
state regulatory choices. This part explains how federal regulatory
action may increase the amount of state-level environmental
regulation, even in the absence of direct federal incentives.
Federal action may alter the policy agenda at the state level by
highlighting or otherwise increasing public awareness of
environmental concerns at the state level. It can also alter the
interest group demand for state-level regulation or facilitate the
adoption of state-level regulation by reducing the costs of enacting
or implementing state regulatory initiatives. In this sense, federal
action can serve as a complement to state regulations.
Part III also contemplates the potential for federal
regulations to have the opposite indirect effect. Specifically, this
section explains how federal regulatory action has the potential to
discourage more protective state rules as well as to “crowd out”
state regulatory efforts insofar as federal regulations serve as a
substitute for state-level environmental protections. This part
describes those conditions under which federal regulation could
result in less overall environmental regulation in a given state than
had the federal government never regulated at all. Specifically,
where the federal government creates a regulatory floor before the
adoption of state-level regulation, it becomes less likely that a
given state will adopt regulations of its own in the future. This can
be true even if at a later date, due to a state’s own environmental
transition, the amount of environmental regulation demanded in a
state is greater than that provided by the federal government. As a
result, the adoption of a federal regulatory floor that increases
aggregate levels of environmental protection in the short run may,
in the long run, result in less environmental protection in a given
state.
Insofar as one assumes that increased levels of
environmental regulation will, on the margin, increase net welfare,
non-preemptive federal environmental regulations could still
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produce net welfare reductions over time.12 This could be true
even if one assumes that a given federal regulation is, when viewed
in isolation, cost-beneficial, as well as if one ignores potential
qualitative differences between states and the federal government
that may produce more optimal regulation at the state level.
In order to simplify the analysis, the bulk of this article
discusses the effects of federal action on state policy choices in
quantitative terms, such as whether federal action produces more
or less of a given type of state regulation. Part IV explains how
this oversimplifies the analysis in two respects. First, while it is
common to suggest that more environmental regulation is better
than less regulation, it is not always clear that greater levels of
environmental regulation are always welfare enhancing. The
optimal level of environmental regulation in a given context may
be greater than current levels, but it may also be less. Second,
environmental regulation can vary in both quantitative and
qualitiative ways, and the latter variations among competing
environmental policies may be more important to the attainment of
optimal levels of environmental protection than any quantitative
regulatory target. Accounting for qualitative differences in
environmental policy measures may unduly complicate the
analysis, but they should not be ignored.
Demonstrating the theoretical possibility that federal
regulation may “crowd out” state-level environmental protection,
does not establish that such crowding out has, or will, occur in any
specific regulatory context. With this caveat in mind, Part V
reconsiders the history of environmental protection at the state and
federal level with a particular focus on wetland regulation. The
history of state and federal regulation in this area is consistent with
12

It should be noted that increases in the stringency of environmental regulation
will not necessarily produce net increases in social welfare. Insofar as the costs
of increased environmental regulation, economic and otherwise, are greater than
the benefits, increased regulation will reduce social welfare. However, insofar
as one assumes that existing environmental regulations are under-protective, the
potential for federal regulations to discourage greater protection at the state level
should be of some concern. See also infra Part IV.
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the crowding out hypothesis and other aspects of this analysis. It
does not by itself, however, demonstrate that such crowding out
has occurred. Rather, it underscores the need for greater attention
to the effect federal policy decisions have on state policy choices
and also suggests the need for further empirical examination of this
issue.13
I.

THE DEMAND FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

The demand for environmental regulation is not static.
Instead it changes over time. As a general matter, demand for
environmental protection has increased along with increases in
wealth and scientific knowledge. It is also influenced by many
other factors that may fluctuate over time and from place to place.
As Professor Farber summarized, “the passage of environmental
laws is attributable to strong public demand, coupled with
exploitation of that demand by ideological and credit-seeking
politicians.”14 The relevant question is what determines the level
of public demand for environmental protection, as well as the
strength and involvement of other policy actors. Understanding
the factors that influence the demand for environmental is
necessary to analyze the effect federal regulations may have on
state regulatory choices.
A. The Environmental Transition
There was not always a significant demand for
environmental regulation. While this nation has a long and proud
conservation history, dating back at least until the creation of
hunting-oriented conservation groups in the late 1800s, many of
13

Identifying and quantifying the extent of any such crowding out and other
indirect effects of non-preemptive federal regulation on state regulatory
activities in the environmental and other regulatory contexts is a subject for
subsequent empirical investigation, and lies beyond the scope of this paper.
14
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 59, 61 (1992).
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the environmental matters subject to regulation today were not
seen as significant public concerns. Even as various environmental
problems began to emerge, they were not initially seen as
significant policy concerns. Some environmental problems were
regarded as the inevitable, if not wholly desirable, consequence of
economic progress and industrial growth.15 In other cases, society
was simply unaware of the magnitude of certain environmental
harms. In still other instances, official policy sought to encourage
environmental modifications and land-use changes that current
policy now seeks to reverse.16
The state of environmental knowledge was relatively poor.
Environmental resources were devalued, and some environmental
offenses were even believed to be positive goods. Wetlands were
viewed as breeding grounds for mosquitoes that spread disease; the
important ecological functions wetlands provide were
underappreciated, if even understood at all.17 Predators and pest
species were targets for extermination, with little consideration of
the role various species play in health ecosystems.18 In the 19580s,
government agencies sprayed DDT and other pesticides
indiscriminately, even over the objections of local landowners,
with little cognizance of the potential consequences for non-target
15

See, e.g., WILLIAM DONAHUE ELLIS, THE CUYAHOGA 157 (1966) (noting that
some viewed the prismatic colors of pollution on the Cuyahoga River as “the
sweetest colors a river ever had”). External factors also effected the level of
concern about waste management and other environmental practices. See, e.g.,
CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER N. SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LOVE CANAL:
MANAGING INDUSTRIAL WASTE BEFORE EPA139-41 (1996) (wartime
imperatives reduced concern for industrial waste management during World
War II).
16
For examples of how federal policy has encouraged environmental harm, see
generally GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT (Donald R. Leal & Roger E.
Meiners eds. 2002).
17
See David E. Gerard, Federal Flood Policies: 150 Years of Environmental
Mischief, in GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT supra note 16, at 59–77; PAUL
SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS PROGRAMS 16
(1997).
18
See J. Bishop Grewell, War on Wildlife, in GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 16, at 97-121.
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species.19 At one time, many thought smoke and coal dust had
“antiseptic” qualities and could stem the spread of tuberculosis.20
In the first part of the Twentieth Century, environmental protection
as it is understood today was not a prominent public concern,
particularly in comparison to economic development,
technological progress, and addressing other social ills. Insofar as
environmental protection registered on the public agenda, it was
focused on sanitation and drinking water, not recreational or
aesthetic values.
As the nation awakened to environmental concerns,
regulations and other protective measures were put in place. State
by state, city by city, the nation began to go through what can be
termed an “environmental transition.”21 Places that once placed
little value on environmental protection now sought the adoption
of stringent regulatory measures.
Increased environmental
concern, combined with other factors, led to the adoption of a new
generation of local, state, and eventually federal environmental
controls. The first regulatory measures were local ordinances
designed to control smoke22 – one of the first modern
environmental problems to be recognized as such. Later measures
addressed other air pollution concerns, water pollution, and
eventually other environmental problems.23
This increase in demand for environmental protection can
best be understood as resulting from an “environmental transition,”
during which a given community or jurisdiction develops a
demand for a given type of environmental protection. This
19

See Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, Silent Springs and Silent
Villages: Pesticides and the Trampling of Property Rights, in GOVERNMENT VS.
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 16,, at 15-37.
20
INDUR M. GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON
AIR POLLUTION 11 (1999).
21
GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 5, 87-109.
22
See Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States,
32 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 44, 44 (1982).
23
See Adler, supra note 2, at 98-100; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553,
577 (2001).
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transition is driven, in large part, by increases in economic wellbeing. As higher-order priorities are addressed, and quality of life
improves, societies begin to devote more resources to previously
neglected concerns. As populations become wealthier, both their
willingness and ability to pay for environmental protection
increase dramatically.24 At the same time, increases in
development tend to coincide with increases in technological
capabilities and the accumulation of scientific and other knowledge
which may reveal heretofore unknown aspects of environmental
problems, further heightening the desire for change.25 It is also
likely that the increase in development itself, insofar as it results in
increased pollution and other environmental harms, further serves
to increase the priority of environmental protection. A given level
of pollution initially may be viewed as an acceptable trade-off for
increased prosperity and industrialization. Yet over time, as
prosperity and pollution both increase, priorities change eventually
leading to a reduction in pollution levels. The theory of an
environmental transition can explain the Environmental Kuznets
Curve documented in an extensive economic literature, in which
pollution levels initially increase but then eventually decline as
societal wealth increases over time.26
24

GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 5 (“the wealthier the society, the more it can
afford to research, develop, and install the technologies necessary for a cleaner
environment.”).
25
GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 89.
26
See Bruce Yandle, Maya Vijayaraghavan & Madhusudan Bhattarai, The
Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Primer, PERC RESEARCH STUDY 02-01 (May
2002); see also Richard L. Stroup, ECO-NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13-14 (2003) (summarizing
research finding that willingness-to-pay for environmental protection increases
with income); Jason Scott Johnston, On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 146 (2002) (“There is abundant evidence that the demand
for outdoor recreation and environmental amenities increases with national
income.”); Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introduction: The Toxic
Liability Problem: Why Is It Too Large?, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: TOXIC
POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE LAW 15 (Richard L.
Stroup & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2000) (“Willingness to pay for environmental
measures . . . is highly elastic with respect to income.”); Kenneth E. McConnell,
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For any given environmental problem, the environmental
transition begins with a “period of perception” – a period “during
which a substance . . . gains sufficient notoriety to be perceived as
a . . . pollutant by the public and, perhaps more importantly, by
policymakers.”27 Unless a given environmental problem is
recognized as such, there is no reason to expect any institution,
public or private, to do much about it. This period of perception is
itself facilitated by both changes in social priorities as well
increases in scientific and technical knowledge. While societal
affluence and technological capacity are almost certainly
interdependent, they both seem to be important elements of the
environmental transition.28 In most cases, however, the period of
perception will precede the adoption of policies to address a given
environmental concern. For many environmental problems, the
period of perception began in states and local communities before
it occurred at the federal level. As a result, many state and local
governments adopted relevant environmental measures before the
federal government.
The concept of the environmental transition is important in
evaluating state regulatory policy as the transition occurs for
different environmental problems at different places and at
different times. Certain states will go through a period of
perception for particular concerns at different times, due to a wide
range of factors, some of which are discussed below. When a state
goes through the environmental transition for a particular concern
is important for evaluating the influence of federal policy on state
Income and the Demand for Environmental Quality, 2 ENVTL. & DEV. ECON.
383, 385-86 (1997) (reporting on empirical evidence of an environmental
Kuznets curve); Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for
Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives,
40 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1997) (noting that most environmental goods are normal
goods for which demand rises with income); Patrick Low, Trade and the
Environment: What Worries the Developing Countries?, 23 ENTVL. L. 705, 706
(1993) (noting that “the demand for improved environmental quality tends to
rise with income.”).
27
GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 3.
28
See GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 89.
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regulatory choices. Where a state’s environmental transition
precedes federal regulation, the effect of federal action on state
policy choices may well be different than when a state goes
through the transition after federal regulations are already in
place.29
B. Determinants of State Regulation
The rate at which different states adopted environmental
protections varied greatly. Some went through their environmental
transitions with regard to particular environmental concerns well
before others. Some of this pattern of state and local activity may
be explained by the increase in economic prosperity, and a
resulting increase in the demand for environmental protection. As
already noted, it is generally accepted that as people become
wealthier, their willingness to pay for environmental protection
increases, resulting in an eventual decline in at least some
measures of pollution.30 Yet wealth and per capita income are not
sufficient in themselves to explain the patterns of state regulation.
The variation in state environmental priorities is greater than
differences in economic factors alone would indicate. Numerous
other factors also play a role.
As a state’s population grows, many environmental impacts
will increase. The pressure to develop previously undeveloped
land will rise; there will be more vehicles on the road; demand for
energy production will increase, and so on. Therefore, population
growth (and other measures of development) could well correlate
with a demand for increased environmental protection.31 The
29

In addition, as discussed infra Part III, the adoption of federal regulations may
themselves influence when a state goes through the environmental transition for
a given environmental concern.
30
See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
31
This increase in the demand for environmental protection should also be
driven, in part, by the increased marginal value of undeveloped land or resources
as the supply dwindles. For example, holding all else equal, the marginal value
of each acre of undeveloped land in a sparsely populated and largely

14

Adler – When Is Two A Crowd?

DRAFT – Not for Citation

amount of land available for development or environmental
preservation should have a significant impact on the demand for at
least some sorts of environmental protection.
The economic and ecological benefits provided by various
environmental resources – “the wealth of nature” – could also
contribute to the demand for environmental protection, whether or
not they are priced and incorporated into economic markets.
Wetlands, for example, provide many ecosystem functions,
including water filtration, species habitat, and flood control.32
Insofar as these services have value in a state’s economy, the state
government should be more likely to protect wetlands so as to
maintain that value. Thus, for example, there may be greater
support for coastal protections in a state with industries that rely
upon coastal resources, such as fishing or tourism.33 In a similar
fashion, states that receive substantial revenue from hunting and
fishing licenses, bird-watching, and the sale of outdoor recreationrelated goods and services may support greater land and habitat
conservation measures, at least insofar as the benefits of such
measures can be captured within the state.
In one sense, efforts to protect a state’s “wealth of nature”
will be due to local knowledge about the benefits of local
environmental amenities.
Environmental knowledge, like
economic knowledge, is decentralized.34 Specific knowledge
undeveloped state should be less than the value of an acre in a highly developed
state.
32
See generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND
REGULATION 37-60 (1984).
33
Likewise, a state in which coastal tourism industries predominate is likely to
have different priorities within the realm of coastal protection than a state in
which fishing or other coastal-related industries are more dominant.
34
See, e.g., John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1218 (1995) (noting that “the knowledge necessary to
administer any air pollution control program . . . can be found only at the local
level.”). This observation is based on the insights of Nobel Laureate economist
F.A. Hayek, who observed “[t]he knowledge of the circumstances of which we
must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all
the separate individuals possess.” F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
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about local ecological conditions – threats, problems, and solutions
– is more likely to be found at the local level than in a centralized
regulatory bureaucracy.35 Due to the decentralized nature of
knowledge, one might expect that environmental protections would
be adopted first in those areas where local knowledge about the
need for such protection is the greatest. A state in which there is
substantial knowledge about the ecological benefits of wetlands –
and the costs and extent of wetland losses – may be more likely to
regulate than a state in which such knowledge is relatively lacking.
This knowledge could be measured by economic data that measure
the value of wetlands to a state’s economy.
Even apart from wealth and economic effects,
environmental causes are clearly more popular in some states than
in others. For whatever reason, the political culture of some states
is more hospitable to the adoption of environmental regulations
than others. While this may correlate with other variables, such as
income, wealth, education, and the like, there is evidence that state
environmental policies are in part a function of the environmental
attitudes of state citizens.36
State environmental policy preferences can be measured in
various ways. For instance, the League of Conservation Voters, a
prominent national environmental organization, publishes an
annual vote rating for members of the U.S. Senate and the U.S.
House of Representatives. LCV ratings appear to correlate with
Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945). For more on the
“knowledge problem” in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Letting
Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur Environmental Innovation, in
THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE
PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 265-66 (Jim Chen ed., 2004).
35
HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1996) (“Federal regulators never have been and
never will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information
necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the technical
requirements of particular locations and pollution sources.”).
36
See TESKE, supra note 9, at 169 (citing Matthew Potosky, Clean Air
Federalism: Do States Race to the Bottom?, 61 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 335
(2001)).
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political preference for environmental regulatory policies.37 These
ratings vary from state to state, and do not appear to be explained
solely by economic factors.38 Another measure of support for state
support for environmental measures more generally could be
membership or contributions to state-level environmental
organizations.39
There are several other independent political variables that
could influence the likelihood that a given state will adopt
measures to protect wetlands. Some state governments may be
more “activist” or “professional” than others. It is possible that
states with larger state governments, measured by budget or
personnel, would be more likely to adopt environmental
regulations than states with smaller, less active governments.
37

See TESKE, supra note 9, at 191.
See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in
Environmental Law, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 369, 374-380
(Jim Chen ed., 2003). There are some potential problems with the use of LCV
vote ratings to measure the environmental nature of a given state’s politics.
First, some would argue that the LCV vote ratings are politicized, if not
somewhat partisan. In this critique, the LCV vote ratings do not measure
whether a given politician is “pro-environment” so much as whether he or she
votes in line with Washington, D.C.-based environmental organizations and that
such organizations have institutional or political interests which may conflict
with some environmental goals.
Insofar as such groups do not maintain a monopoly on what policy
positions are “pro-environment,” a politician could receive a lower vote rating
despite his or her attentiveness to environmental concerns. At the same time,
because environmental issues may differ at the state and federal level, a “proenvironment” vote rating in Congress may not correlate with attentiveness to
environmental concerns in a given state. It may be that in a given state,
environmental issues addressed by state and local governments are more
important to voters than environmental issues typically addressed by the federal
government, or vice versa. It is not altogether clear that state concern for local
environmental problems would necessarily translate into support for politicians
that are supportive of measures to address national, or even international,
environmental problems. Nonetheless, LCV ratings are almost certainly
measuring a factor that influences state regulatory choices, even if only the
political influence of mainstream environmental interest groups.
39
See TESKE, supra note 9 at 186.
38
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Among other things, this could reflect the political culture of the
state, as some states will be more receptive to government
regulation of any sort than others. In the political science
literature, measures of the “professionalism” of state government
often correlate with the willingness to adopt regulatory measures.40
Some states may also be more ideologically predisposed to support
the creation of regulatory programs. Therefore which party
controls the statehouse or various policy positions could also affect
state regulatory policy choices.41
State regulatory choices are also influenced by the actions
of other states. The “race to the bottom” theory posits that states
will be discouraged from adopting the optimal level of
environmental protections due to interjurisdictional competition
with other states.42 The theory is that states seeking to encourage
economic investment and industrial development will be locked
into a “race” to lower existing environmental standards (or fail to
adopt optimal measures) in an effort to attract investment, and that
any resulting economic gains will fail to offset the welfare losses
from suboptimally lax environmental regulations.43 Though
possible, empirical evidence demonstrating a race to the bottom in

40

See TESKE, supra note 9, at 187-88; Chris Mooney, Measuring U.S. State
Legislative Professionalism: An evaluation of Five Indices, 26 STATE & LOCAL
GOV’T REV. 70 (1994).
41
See TESKE, supra note 9, at 181-82 (finding correlation between party control
of legislature and state regulatory activity).
42
See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977); see also CLIFFORD RECTHSCHAFFEN & DAVID L.
MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22–25 (2003) (the race-to-the-bottom theory is
the “central underpinning” of federal environmental regulation); WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE HOME VOTER HYPOTHESIS 162 (2001) (noting “a widespread
belief that competition among jurisdictions poses a danger of a mutually
destructive ‘race to the bottom.’”).
43
See id; see also Engel supra note 6; Swire supra note 6; Esty, supra note 5, at
628.
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environmental policy is generally lacking.44 There is evidence that
state policy makers consider the impact of environmental
regulations on their states’ economic competitiveness.45
Nonetheless, most empirical studies have failed to find any
evidence that such pressures result in a systematic lowering of
state-level environmental measures.46
Whether or not there is a “race to the bottom” in
environmental policy, the existence of interjurisdictional spillovers
may discourage states from adopting some environmental
protections.47
Where states are able to extraterritorialize the
environmental effects of their own industrial growth, they will be
less likely to adopt environmental controls. An upwind state may
adopt air pollution control measures to protect its own citizens –
who vote and pay taxes within the state – but is highly unlikely to
adopt environmental measures designed to protect citizens of
downwind jurisdictions. At the same time, the downwind
jurisdiction may be less likely to adopt environmental measures if
such measures will be relatively unable to control environmental
problems that are largely due to activities in upwind jurisdictions.
States can also be encouraged to adopt greater levels of
environmental protection by the actions of their neighbors. Insofar
as one state is successful at addressing a given environmental
problem in a cost-effective manner, other states become more
44
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the ‘Race to the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); see also Adler, Jurisdictional
Mismatch, supra note 10, at 151-154.
45
Engel, supra note 6.
46
Several economic studies have failed to find empirical evidence of any race to
the bottom in environmental policy. See, e.g., Daniel L. Millimet & John A.
List, A Natural Experiment on the ‘Race to the Bottom’ Hypothesis: Testing for
Stochastic Dominance in Temporal Pollution Trends, 65 OXFORD BULL. OF
ECON. & STAT. 395 (2003); Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact
of Environmental Federalism, 43 J. OF REGIONAL SCI. 711 (2003); John A. List
& Shelby Gerking, Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the
United States, 40 J. OF REGIONAL SCI. 453 (2000); see also Oates, supra note 5,
at 11-17.
47
See Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10.
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likely to follow suit as they learn from competing jurisdictions.
This hypothesis has some empirical support in studies showing that
state decisions to adopt specific regulatory measures are influenced
by the decision of neighboring jurisdictions to adopt similar
measures.48 These studies find stronger evidence for this positive
“contagion” effect than for a negative “race to the bottom.”49
Just as state policy makers can be influenced by policy
decisions and environmental conditions in other states, state policy
makers can be influenced by the federal government. Federal
regulatory decisions undoubtedly affect state environmental policy
choices. At the extreme, some commentators suggest that state
regulatory choices are heavily influenced, if not effectively
dictated by, federal policy.50 Well short of this extreme, it is
possible that the federal government still exercises a substantial
influence on state regulatory decision-making, intentionally or not.
Whereas some federal policies directly seek to influence or
preclude certain state policies, others may influence the relative
costs and benefits of state policies, thereby encouraging or
discouraging state regulatory action. Unlike many of the other
factors driving environmental policy decisions at the state level,
these effects have been relatively unexplored.
II.

DIRECT FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE POLICY CHOICES

48

See Oates, supra note 5, at 15 (“States appear to be ‘pulled’ to higher levels of
abatement spending by more stringent measures in neighboring states, but
relatively lax regulations nearby appear to have no effect on such
expenditures”); TESKE, supra note 9, at 180-81 (finding states are more likely to
increase, rather than decrease, air quality regulation in response to actions taken
in neighboring states, and concluding that “the race to the bottom is not a factor
here”); id. at 191-92 (finding same pattern in groundwater regulation).
49
Id.
50
See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Preemption:
Lessons from Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 203
(1997)( “For the most part, states are not genuinely autonomous regulators; they
exercise regulatory authority only by congressional grace.”).
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Federal policy decisions can have both direct and indirect
effects on state regulatory choices. Their effects may also be either
positive or negative, both in terms of the quantity and quality of
state regulation. The potential of both positive and negative effects
weakens a common presumption that federal environmental
measures will be welfare-enhancing. It is possible that in some
states the aggregate level of environmental protection could be
lower than it would otherwise be due to the existence of federal
regulations that discourage state environmental protection
measures.
The most direct way for the federal government to
influence state environmental policy decisions would be to dictate
state policies from Washington, D.C. While this approach was
considered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,51 and
mulled over by academics,52 it is clearly unconstitutional under
current Supreme Court precedent. State governments remain
“sovereign” under the doctrine of “dual sovereignty,”53 and
therefore cannot be commandeered by the federal government.
Whether to ensure sufficient disposal capacity for low-level
radioactive waste54 or remedy lead contamination in drinking
water,55 the federal government cannot require state governments
to adopt desired policy measures. Articulated by the Supreme
51
See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99
(1977); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA
v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971
(D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). This
litigation is summarized in Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 423.
52
See, e.g., Richard Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L.J. 1196 (1976-77).
53
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
54
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)(holding portions of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments unconstitutionally
commandeer state governments).
55
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v.
Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996)(invalidating portions of the Lead
Contamination Control Act).
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Court in clear and unequivocal terms, this anti-commandeering
principle admits no exceptions.56
Despite the prohibition on federal commandeering of state
governments, the federal government retains substantial ability to
influence state policy-making. The powers enumerated in Article I
of the Constitution provide abundant means of encouraging state
and local governments to act in accordance with federal
preferences. If the federal government seeks to prevent states from
regulating in a given field, it may preclude states from acting.
Such preemption should, in principle, be authorized by Congress,
though federal agency actions can also have preclusive effect.
Under the Supremacy Clause, the federal government has the
largely unchallenged authority to preempt contrary state laws
through the exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers.
Preemption is used to reduce the amount of state regulatory
activity.57
56

See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or
benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our
constitutional system of dual sovereignty”). There is language in Printz that
suggests purely ministerial requirements might be exempt from the anticommandeering rule, but the federal courts have not, as yet, found an attempted
commandeering that was sufficiently immaterial to warrant an exception. This
may be due, in part, to the fact that relatively few statutes, environmental or
otherwise, commandeer state governments. There are a few such statutes in the
environmental context, but these statutes have never been challenged in court.
As these statutes impose minimal requirements on state governments, and the
relevant programs are already in place, it is unlikely that these statutes will be
challenged in the future. See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10
, at 423 430.
Where federal courts have excused commandeering of state agencies in
the environmental context, it has been by denying that commandeering is taking
place. The court’s order in Strahan v. Coxe arguably commandeered state
officials under the federal Endangered Species Act, yet the First Circuit denied
this was the case. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); Adler,
Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 429-30
57
“Regulatory activity” here should be understood to include legislation and
agency regulations, as well as judicial decrees that have a forward-looking
regulatory effect, including tort judgments that create de facto standards for
product safety or professional conduct.
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If the federal government seeks to encourage greater
regulatory activity by state governments, it may offer various
inducements. These inducements may be positive (carrots) or
negative (sticks). The most straightforward way to encourage state
activity is to offer financial support for state programs that meet
federal requirements or to otherwise confer benefits on compliant
state governments. In some cases more punitive measures may be
required, such as the threat to preempt regulatory activity by
noncompliant states or reduce funding from unrelated programs.
In practice, the federal government often resorts to some
combination of these measures to encourage the desired level of
state regulation. The ways in which federal policy may influence
state regulatory decisions directly are illustrated in Figure 1a and
discussed in greater detail below.
Figure 1a
Federal Influence on State Regulatory Activity
Direct
More State
Regulation
(“positive”)
Less State
Regulation
(“negative”)

Indirect

Commandeering
Inducement
Preemption

A. Preemption
Where Congress adopts a law pursuant to its enumerated
powers, it preempts conflicting state laws. Federal preemption
comes in two forms, express and implied. Express preemption is
straightforward. Where Congress, or a federal agency, explicitly
preempts state laws on a given subject, states are barred from
adopting and enforcing their own regulations.58 Yet Congress need
58

See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (“It is well established that within
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not be so explicit for courts to find preemption. Preemption may
be implied either “where the scheme of federal regulation is so
persuasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the states to supplement it,”59 so-called “field
preemption,” or where state and federal law conflict or compliance
with state law would obstruct, if not preclude, compliance with
federal law, so-called “conflict preemption.”60
Although courts may find federal preemption where
Congress has not made its intent to preempt state law explicit, such
judgments are not to be made lightly.61 Generally, there is a
presumption against finding preemption.62 Explicit statutory
language easily overcomes this presumption, as does a clear
conflict between state and federal law. If federal law is supreme, it
will not yield to conflicting state enactments. In other cases, the
presumption will be overcome where there are indicia of
Congressional intent suggesting that the federal government did
not intend to allow state interference in a given area or field. In
such cases, and when preemption is inferred from federal agency

Constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in
express terms.”).
59
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
60
Id.
61
See Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Michael S. Greve &
Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical
Assessment, __ SUP. CT. ECON. REV. __ (forthcoming).
62
See Wisc. Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (“When
considering preemption, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Although this is the stated
presumption, it is not clear how powerfully this presumption is applied in
practice. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA, L. REV. 225 (2000); Thomas
W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory,
and
Default
Rules,
available
at
http://federalismproject.org/preemption/papers/Merrill_Preemption_in_Environmental_Law.pdf.
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action, Congressional intent is “the ultimate touchstone” of
preemption analysis.63
Preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity.
The net effect of federal preemption is for there to be less
regulation than there would have been otherwise.64 Federal laws
precluding state regulation of automobile or oil tanker design mean
that manufacturers need only comply with one regulatory standard.
Federal regulations in such cases serve as a regulatory “floor” and
a regulatory “ceiling” at the same time. In other cases, preemption
may serve to ensure that there is no regulation of a given type or
governing particular subject matter, as where federal law precludes
states from adopting particular rules, but the federal government
does not adopt rules of its own.65 Where implied preemption is
found, this will typically preclude any state or local regulation
whatsoever.66
Where Congress explicitly preempts state
regulation, however, the scope of the preemption usually will be
limited to the extent provided for in the statutory text.
63

Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see also CSX Transp. V.
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (courts should “focus on the plain
wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’
preemptive intent”).
64
In some cases the purpose of federal preemption is to replace one type of
regulation with another. This still results in less regulation than if the federal
regulation was adopted in addition to the state regulation. The effects of
preemption across states may not be uniform, however. A federal statute that
imposes a federal standard when only a handful of states have regulated will
increase regulation in some jurisdictions at the same time that it reduces
regulation by preempting preexisting rules elsewhere.
65
The most obvious example, albeit a case of constitutional rather than statutory
preemption, occurs under the “dormant commerce clause.” States are precluded
from adopting measures that discriminate against out-of-state trade not because
it is assumed that such regulations will be adopted by Congress. Rather, there is
a constitutional presumption against the adoption of such rules by any level of
government, though Congress does retain the authority to adopt laws limiting
the flow of interstate commerce or even delegating authority to the states to
adopt such measures themselves. This division of authority “creates obstacles to
states’ enacting laws that are more protective of the environment.” RICHARD J.
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 38 (2004).
66
See Weiland, supra note 11
, at 258 -59.
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Given that preemption operates to reduce aggregate
regulatory burdens,67 it should be no surprise that federal
preemption of state environmental regulatory standards is often
sought by business interests seeking to establish regulatory
uniformity, a “ceiling” on regulatory stringency, or both.68 Federal
preemption of state automotive emission regulations, for example,
resulted from lobbying by U.S. automakers fearing the potential
for different emissions standards to be adopted in different states –
and believing that federal standards would be less stringent than
those developed in the states.69 This is not to say that there are not
sometimes economic justifications for preempting variable state
standards with a single federal standard, only to note that this
pressure for federalization often comes from industry rather than
from environmentalist interests.
The mere adoption of a federal regulatory standard that
operates as a regulatory “floor” does not necessarily preempt state
regulation as a legal matter (though it may well have that practical
effect). For example, a federal regulation imposing emission
limitations on an industrial facility will not necessarily preempt a
less stringent or differently structured state regulation governing
emissions from the same facility. As a practical matter, regulated
facilities will focus on compliance with the more stringent federal
67

See TESKE, supra note 9, at 15 (noting federal preemption has often been
“designed to facilitate greater total deregulation” (emphasis in original)).
68
See Weiland, supra note 11, at 242 (“By creating a ceiling, environmental
laws may allow the private sector to operate within a predictable and uniform
environment”).
Similar arguments have been used to support federal
preemption of state regulations and tort suits in other areas as well. See, e.g.,
Caroline E. Mayer, Rules Would Limit Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006 at
D01 (preemption by Consumer Product Safey Commission); Gary Young, FDA
Strategy Would Preempt Tort Suits, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 1, 2004 (preemption by
food & Drug Administration).
69
See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985). For
other examples of this phenomenon, see ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992);
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L.
Anderson, ed. 2000).
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standard and may ignore the duplicative state requirement (or viceversa). Nonetheless, the existence of the federal standard would
not necessarily absolve the regulated facility from simultaneous
compliance with the state’s regulation, particularly insofar as the
state regulation imposes independent reporting or enforcement
provisions or uses an alternative means of determining
compliance.70 There is no conflict as it is possible to comply with
both rules; by meeting the more stringent regulation a facility
would also comply with the less stringent regulation. If permits
are required from both federal and state agencies for facility
operation, then both permits are required even if compliance with
one should make compliance with the other a foregone conclusion,
unless the less stringent standards are explicitly or otherwise
preempted by the federal regulation.71
Preemption is common in environmental law, particularly
concerning the regulation of products that are manufactured for
sale in interstate commerce.72 For example, section 209(b) of the
Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting “any standard relating
to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles.”73 The
Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any state regulation of

70

Levels of stringency are not the only way in which federal and state standards
could differ. For example, it would be possible for the federal government to
impose a technology standard on a given facility while the state government
could impose an explicit emission limit, or vice-versa.
71
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (preempting state enforcement of emission
standards less stringent than existing federal standards).
72
Ann Carlson, Federalism, Preemption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 306 (2003) (“environmental regulation – in which both
the states and the federal government play an active role – frequently raises
preemption questions”).
73
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). There are exceptions to this rule. The EPA may waive
preemption of emission standards adopted by California, subject to certain
conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). Where the EPA has approved a waiver for
California, other states may adopt the California rule. In all cases, however, the
other 49 states may not adopt a “third” standard. The Clean Air Act contains
similar provisions governing standards for gasoline. 42 U.S.C. § 211(c)(4).
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automotive fuel economy.74 Other preemption provisions can be
found in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,75
and the Toxic Substances Control Act,76 among other statutes. In
United States v. Locke, the Supreme Court found Washington
State’s laws governing the prevention of spills from oil tankers to
be preempted by relevant federal laws.77 Federal environmental
laws have also been found to preempt the federal common law of
interstate nuisance.78
B. Inducement
Whereas the federal government has broad authority to
preclude state regulation, its power to induce state regulation is
more proscribed.
State sovereignty precludes the federal
government from dictating state regulatory initiatives. Such
“commandeering” of legislative or executive functions violates the
residual sovereignty of state governments and is not a “necessary
and proper” exerc ise of federal power.79 This constitutional
prohibition hardly leaves the federal government without
substantial ability to prompt state regulatory efforts. As the
Supreme Court noted in New York v. United States, there are “a
variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress
may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with
74

49 U.S.C. § 32919(a). Unlike with emission standards, there is no conditional
exemption for California.
75
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). There has been a significant amount of litigation about
the scope of preemption under this provision, in part because FIFRA also
contains a savings clause at 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). See generally Alexandra B.
Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7
MINN. J. L. SCIENCE & TECH. 89 (2005).
76
15 U.S.C. § 2617.
77
529 U.S. 89 (2000) (finding preemption under the Port and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972).
78
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). See also Robert
Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of
Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004).
79
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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federal interests.” 80 Congress can encourage “cooperative”
regulatory efforts by offering states financial and other resources to
implement regulatory programs in conformity with federal
requirements. Where such rewards are insufficient, Congress may
impose various penalties on noncompliant states, threatening to cut
off funds unrelated to the regulatory program at issue or to preempt
state regulatory programs that do not meet federal dictates.
The federal government’s power to induce state
cooperation is on display throughout the environmental portions of
the U.S. Code. While current federal environmental laws grant
expansive regulatory authority to federal agencies, most
environmental statutes are implemented through a “cooperative
federalism” model.81
The federal government outlines the
contours of a given regulatory program, and states are encouraged
to implement the program in accordance with federal regulations
with a combination of carrots and sticks.82 The carrots include
funding for state regulatory programs. The sticks include the
threat of federal preemption – specifically, if states refuse to
regulate as the federal government demands, the federal
government may regulate in their place – and, in some instances,
the loss of federal funding not directly related to the
implementation of environmental regulations.
Provided the
relevant standards are met, states are free to tailor the details of
80

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (1992) (“where Congress has the authority to
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized
Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according
to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. . . .
This arrangement . . . has been termed cooperative federalism.” (internal
citations and quotations omitted)). Statutes that employ the cooperative
federalism model include the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, portions of the Safe Drinking Water Act, and
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
82
See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD.
L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1995). See also DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION
(1997).
81
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their individual programs to accommodate local conditions and
concerns. 83
The strongest inducements for state cooperation are
probably found in the Clean Air Act.84 Under the CAA, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants, such as
ozone (“smog”) and particulate matter (“soot”). States with
metropolitan areas that fail to attain NAAQS are required to draft
State Implementation Plans (SIPs), including a wide-range of
federally mandated pollution control measures, which states then
submit to the EPA for its approval.85 Failure to submit an adequate
SIP by the appropriate deadlines can result in the imposition of one
or more federal sanctions, including the loss of federal highway
funds, increased offset requirements for new development, and the
imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) that the EPA
will enforce.86 In addition, local transportation projects cannot
receive federal funding unless they conform to an EPA-approved
SIP.87
Federal inducement does not guarantee that states will
adopt measures that satisfy federal policy makers. It does,
however, adjust the relative costs and benefits (economic and
83

Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good
Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1534 (1995) (“The essence of cooperative
federalism is that states take primary responsibility for implementing federal
standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent
standards.”). A notable exception is the case of product standards. As a general
matter, federal product standards, such as vehicle emission standards, tend to
preempt more stringent state standards. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)
(preemption of state automobile emission standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)
(preemption of state fuel standards).
84
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661f.
85
42 U.S.C. § 7410.
86
42 U.S.C. § 7509. It should be noted that the imposition of such sanctions is
not solely, or even primarily, within the EPA’s discretion, as individual citizens
and activist groups may force the EPA’s hands through citizen suits seeking to
enforce the express requirements of the CAA and regulations promulgated
pursuant to it. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
87
42 U.S.C. § 7506.
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otherwise) of regulatory choices. If states decide that the costs of
following federal preferences are greater than the value of the
incentives offered (or if the costs are greater than bearing the
punitive sanction threatened), they may not follow federal wishes.
Indeed, in the 1970s when the EPA claimed the authority to
commandeer state officials directly, some government officials still
balked.88 States retain the ability to reject federal requirements
under the Act, yet some would argue that this combination of
inducements virtually assures state cooperation.89
III.

INDIRECT FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE POLICY CHOICES

Federal policies that directly influence state regulatory
decisions are only half of the picture. Just as the federal action
may encourage or discourage state regulatory action directly,
federal action may indirectly, or even incidentally, encourage or
discourage state regulatory action. Federal policies will facilitate
greater state regulation where such actions reduce the costs of state
implementation, such as by subsidizing necessary research, or
where federal policies increase the demand for given regulatory
policies at the state level so as to alter or “set” state policy agendas.
Federal policies will discourage state regulatory action where they
“signal” that state regulatory action is excessive or unnecessary or
where they reduce the marginal benefits of adopting state
regulatory programs – benefits either to the general welfare, those
interest groups demanding state regulatory activity, or to the
policymakers responsible for adopting the relevant policies.90
88

See Stewart, supra note 42, at 1204 (“State and local officials refused to
enforce many of the [EPA]’s unpopular controls.”); see also supra note ___, and
cases cited therein.
89
This author has argued elsewhere that, while the CAA’s inducement scheme is
effective, it is may be unconstitutional. See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra
note 10, at 447-52.
90
It should be noted that the hypotheses presented in this section are not
dependent upon any particular theory about what sorts of interests ultimately
drive the policymaking process. The hypotheses are equally compatible with
public interest and public choice theories of policy formation.
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Such “crowding out” is most likely to occur where federal
regulations serve as a substitute for state regulations, though there
may be other factors that have a similar effect. Adding in these
indirect influences – facilitation, agenda setting, signaling, and
crowding out – produces a more complete matrix of the ways in
which federal policies influence state regulatory choices (see
Figure 1b below).
Figure 1b
Federal Influence on State Regulatory Activity
More State
Regulation
(“positive”)
Less State
Regulation
(“negative”)

Direct

Indirect

Commandeering
Inducement

Agenda Setting
Facilitation

Preemption

Signaling
Crowding Out

A. Positive Indirect Effects
Federal regulation and other policy measures may
indirectly encourage or facilitate state environmental regulation.
Without offering any direct inducements, the federal government
may encourage state policy makers to adopt environmental
regulations that they would not otherwise enact by affecting the
costs and benefits of state regulatory measures, or by increasing
the demand for given policies at the state level.
1. Agenda Setting
One way in which federal action may indirectly encourage
greater state regulation is taking actions that effect the state-level
policy agenda. Specifically, federal action may elevate the
salience of particular issues to state policymakers, thereby
increasing the demand for regulation or other policy action in a
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given state.91 In this fashion, federal policymakers may engage in
“agenda setting” that influences state regulatory policy choices.
Actions by all three branches can have an agenda setting
effect. For example, a study by an executive agency or
congressional committee may identify a particular health concern
may prompt local action to reduce the threat. National debate over
a given issue, such as whether to create or reform a new
entitlement, may prompt states to act where the federal government
does not. Similarly, a judicial decision either requiring the federal
government to act, or perhaps finding that the federal government
lacks the power to address a given concern, may raise the profile of
a given issue and increase the demand for action at the state level.
An area in which federal agenda setting can be observed is
indoor air pollution.
Indoor air pollution is a serious
environmental problem. Indeed, by some accounts, indoor air
pollution is greater health concern than outdoor air pollution in all
but the most heavily polluted cities.92 Yet indoor air pollution is
not the sort of problem particularly suited to federal regulation.
Insofar as indoor air pollution is a function of building design and
local conditions, and does not involve spillovers across property –
let alone jurisdictional – boundaries, it is the sort of issue that state
and local governments should be able to address.93 State and local
governments are in a better position to address indoor air pollution
through building codes, real estate transaction disclosure
requirements, workplace exposure regulations, and the like. Thus
it should be no surprise that there are few federal regulations
governing indoor air.
91

William W. Buzbee, recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 55 (2003) (“increased activity and
publicity about an issue can over time change stakeholder perceptions and
possibly preferences”).
92
See GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 43 (“indoor air quality, particularly in the
home, is a far better indicator of the impact of air pollution on public health”
than is outdoor air quality).
93
For a discussion of where federal intervention is, and is not, justified to
address environmental concerns, see Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note
10, at 139-157.
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This is not to say that the federal government is inactive,
however. The EPA has programs to address indoor air pollution,
but these programs are, for the most part, designed to increase
awareness and understanding about indoor air concerns.94 The
EPA puts out information, including scientific reports, about radon
levels, environmental tobacco smoke, and other indoor air
concerns.95 These reports both increase the salience of indoor air
pollution for state and local policy makers, and therefore may
increase the demand for state and local regulatory measures.
When the EPA put out a study claiming secondhand smoke is a
carcinogen, it did not prompt federal regulation.96 Yet numerous
local governments cited this study as a basis for local ordinances
controlling secondhand smoke.
Certain federal actions, and the lack thereof, have also
increased the salience of climate change as an environmental
policy concern. Various federal agencies have sponsored research
and published reports on the potential impact of anthropogenic
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases on climate
change.97 Such actions, combined with the efforts of international
94

See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Air – Indoor Air Quality,”
available at http://www.epa.gov/iaq/.
95
For example, the EPA distributes various publications, posters and other
materials on the risks posed by secondhand smoke. See U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, “Indoor Air Quality – Smokefree Homes Program,”
available at http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/publications.html.
96
See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH
EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992),
available
at
http://cfpub2.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=2835.
While quite influential, this study has been subject to criticism and challenged in
court. See Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 4 F.
Supp.2d 435, (M.D.N.C. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 313 F.3d 852 (4th
Cir. 2002).
97
See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENCE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY
QUESTIONS (2001); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE (2000). See also U.S. Environmental
Protection
Agency,
“Global
Warming,”
available
at
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organizations and environmental NGOs, have increased the profile
of “global warming.” At the same time, the federal government
has not adopted any regulatory policies to control emissions of
carbon dioxide and other gases linked to climate change. To the
contrary, both Congress and the Executive have, at times,
explicitly refused to adopt such measures.98
This combination of enhancing climate change’s profile on
the public policy agenda and failing to act created an opportunity
for states. Over the past decade, numerous states have adopted
measures to address climate change concerns.99 Most of these
measures are exceedingly modest, and few involve direct
regulatory controls, but they are more aggressive than those
adopted by the federal government. California, however, has
sought to adopt prescriptive regulatory controls. In July 2002,
California adopted legislation requiring the California Air
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/index.html;
U.S.
Department
of
Energy,
“Climate
Change,”
available
at
http://www.energy.gov/environment/climatechange.htm.
98
Congress considered, and rejected, a proposal to control greenhouse gas
emissions during the debate over the legislation that would eventually become
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. During the Clinton Administration,
several environmental organizations petitioned the EPA, claiming the agency
was nonetheless required to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.
At the time, the EPA declared it had the authority to adopt such regulations, yet
it did not take any steps to do so. Subsequently, under the Bush Administration,
the EPA revised its legal opinion, concluding that the Clean Air Act did not
confer regulatory jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time,
the bush Administration opposed legislative proposals to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions. At the time of this writing, litigation efforts to force the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gases have been unsuccessful. See Massachusetts v. EPA,
__ F.3d __ (D.C. Cir. 2005).
99
See TESKE, supra note 9, at 17 (noting several states adopted carbon dioxide
standards, while others oppose ratification of the Kyoto Protocol); see also
BARRY G. RABE, GREENHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE ROLE
IN CLIMATE CHANGE ix (2002) (“The trend is unmistakably towards more states
taking an active role in climate change.”); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism,
Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 282
(2003)(noting many states “have quietly begun to fill the void in leadership that
some believe exists at the national level”).
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Resources Board to “develop and adopt regulations that achieve
the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles.”100 These regulations were
subsequently finalized in 2004.
Even though the federal
government has not sought to regulate greenhouse gases, federal
actions have almost certainly increased the demand for climate
policies at the state level.
2. Facilitation
A second way that federal action may indirectly encourage
greater state environmental regulation is by reducing the costs of
developing or implementing environmental regulation. Federally
funded scientific research, data collection, and information
disclosure requirements may reduce the fixed costs of developing,
implementing, and enforcing state regulatory programs.
While much of the information required for effective
environmental protection is local in nature, much of the relevant
scientific knowledge will apply nationwide.101 The weather
conditions and topographical features that influence ozone
formation will vary from place-to-place, but the underlying
chemical reactions will not. Federal research into the relative
effectiveness of controls on various ozone precursors can reduce
the cost, and increase the effectiveness, of state-level air quality
regulation.
Were each state required to conduct its own
environmental scientific research, there could be much duplication
and inefficiency.102 In addition, there are likely to be scale
100

A.B. 1493, codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (2003).
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONFRONTING THE NATION’S WATER
PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF RESEARCH 68 (2004) (a federal role “is appropriate in
those research areas where the benefits of such research are widely dispersed
and do not accrue only to those who fund the research”).
102
See Esty, supra note 5, at 614-15 (“Absent centralized functions, independent
state regulators will either duplicate each other’s analytic work of engage in
time-consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient division of
technical labor.”). Of course it is possible that “competition” could improve
101
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economies in the resources and technical expertise required for
some forms of scientific research that reinforces the potential for
federal efforts to facilitate state-level regulation.
Federal information reporting requirements may also
facilitate state regulatory measures. Under the federal Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI), for example, industrial firms are required
to collect and release information about the amount of toxic
“releases” from each facility. The resulting reports provide
voluminous information on the nature and extent of industrial
chemical use and disposal, and provide figures that serve as a
proxy for the extent of industrial pollution. This information
undoubtedly serves to increase the demand for regulation of “toxic
releases.” At the same time, requiring the collection and
publication of this information may reduce the costs of adopting
supplemental state regulatory measures. By requiring the creation,
collection, and dissemination of extensive data about industrial
facilities, federal law may be providing state policymakers with
some of the information necessary to craft state-level responses to
the same concerns. Moreover, insofar as state policymakers can
rely upon industry reports required under federal law, this may
reduce the monitoring costs to ensure compliance with related state
rules. Even modest federal actions may facilitate significant statelevel interventions.
B. Negative Indirect Effects
Just as federal action may indirectly encourage greater state
regulatory activity, federal action may discourage state regulatory
action. This can occur in at least two ways. First, the adoption of
a federal regulatory standard may “signal” that more stringent state
regulations are unnecessary. In effect, the federal standard may be
seen as evidence that a given level of regulatory protection is
sufficient to safeguard relevant public interests, and more stringent
scientific research insofar as different entities pursue different research
methodologies to address emerging environmental problems.
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measures are unnecessary. As a result, the adoption of federal
regulation may induce state policymakers to lower comparable
state protections. In addition, the adoption of a federal regulation
may “crowd out” state regulatory measures by reducing the net
benefits provided by additional state measures. As a result, the
existence of federal regulation may discourage the adoption of
additional state-level regulatory protections in the future.
The potential for federal regulatory measures to reduce the
level of state regulatory activity is significant because it challenges
the prevailing assumption that the adoption of a federal regulatory
standard raises, or at least maintains, the aggregate level of
protection nationwide.103
Many environmental analysts, for
example, suggest that the federal government should adopt a
regulatory “floor,” but allow states to implement federal standards
and adopt more stringent measures of their own. The general
belief is that this will maximize the extent of environmental
protection.104 Yet if the adoption of federal regulatory standard
can induce states to adopt less protective environmental measures
than they would otherwise have adopted, the net benefits of a
federal floor will be less than traditionally assumed, as in some
states it will result in a net reduction in the aggregate level of
environmental protection. Indeed, it is possible that the net result,
over time, of a federal regulatory floor could be the maintenance of
lower levels of environmental protection than would otherwise
have been adopted. Even if such effects are unlikely, federal
policymakers should consider these possibilities when assessing
the likely costs and benefits of federal action.
103

Where federal regulation is preemptive, it may also provide a “ceiling” as
well.
104
See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman, & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition
as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 1, 7
(2005) (noting the notion of federal policy as a ‘floor’ protecting certain
‘fundamental values’ still has vitality” in environmental policy debates). It is
also assumed that more environmental regulation is more optimal than less
regulation. Yet, as a theoretical matter, over-regulation can be just as welfarereducing as under-regulation. See infra ___.
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1. Signaling
Just as federal attention to a given environmental concern
may increase the demand for state-level action, the adoption of a
given federal standard may send a signal that discourages the
adoption or maintenance of more protective state regulations.
Specifically, the adoption of a given regulatory standard by a
federal agency sends a “signal” that the relevant standard is
worthwhile.105 Among other reasons for this effect is that federal
policymakers, particularly federal agencies, are presumed to have
substantial technical expertise. Thus, their actions may convince
state policy makers (or their constituents) that additional
safeguards are “unnecessary” or that the benefits of more stringent
regulatory protections are not worth their costs. The magnitude of
this effect is likely to correspond with the magnitude of the
difference between the relevant federal and state standards. In this
way, federal standards can discourage state policymakers from
adopting and maintaining more stringent measures of their own,
even where such measures could be justified. As a practical
matter, the federal “floor” may become a “ceiling” as well.
This effect is not merely hypothetical. There are numerous
examples of state legislation designed to prevent state
environmental agencies from adopting regulatory standards that
are more stringent than federal rules.106 Between 1987-1995,

105

See McNollgast (Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast), Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 25 (1994) (noting “an action is
informative if it is taken by an informed person who pays a fee, expends effort,
or gorefoes some valuable alternative activity in order to take the action”). On
signaling generally, see JEFFREY S. BANKS, SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE (1991).
106
See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt
Environmental Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1376-86
(1995); see also Arnold W. Rietze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and
Maintenance Program under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 1461, 1465 (1996)
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nearly 20 states adopted at least one statute limiting the ability of
state agencies to adopt regulatory controls more stringent than
relevant federal standards.107 Some states focus on a given
environmental concern, while others have general prohibitions
against the adoption of any environmental rules more stringent
than applicable federal standards.108 New Mexico and Colorado,
for example, have statutes prohibiting the promulgation of air
pollution controls more stringent than required by federal law.109
Virginia law bars state regulatory authorities from requiring greater
amounts of water treatment than mandated under the federal Clean
Water Act.110 Others state have general prohibitions against
agency promulgation of environmental rules more stringent than
federal law.111
The existence of statutes barring state regulatory agencies
from adopting more stringent regulations may be evidence of a
greater hostility to environmental protection in some state
legislatures than in Washington, D.C. Yet such laws may also be a
rational response to the signal created by the adoption of a federal
standard at a given level, particularly insofar as state policymakers
conclude that their federal counterparts have greater expertise
about and understanding of relevant environmental concerns.
Information is costly, and the knowledge and expertise necessary
to determine whether a given level of protection may tax the
resources of state governments. Therefore, deferring to federal
policy judgments by responding to the signal of a federal standard
may enable state policymakers to economize on information and
policy development costs.112

(noting “movement among state legislature to prohibit more stringent state
standards”).
107
Organ, supra note 106, at 1376 n.13.
108
Id. at 1377.
109
See N.M. STATE. ANN. § 74-2-5 (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-7114.2 (2004).
110
See VA CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Michie 2001).
111
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12A.120 (2003).
112
See Organ, supra note 106, at 1390.
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On the other hand, the localized nature of much
environmental knowledge and expertise could suggest that
signaling may systematically encourage less optimal state-level
regulations to the extent federal standards fail to take local needs
and variation into account.113 Some state laws may address this
concern, however, as they allow state agencies to adopt more
protective measures where local conditions warrant.114
There are several reasons why this signaling effect may be
of concern. First, and perhaps most important, the existence of a
signaling effect that reduces the level of state regulations below
what they would otherwise will reduce the net benefits provided by
federal regulations, as illustrated in Figure 2. When the federal
government adopts a federal regulatory standard, this will increase
the level of regulation in those states that have lower levels of
regulation. It will also lower the level of regulation in any state
that adopts laws barring the promulgation of regulations more
stringent than the federal standard.

113

See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
See Organ, supra note 106, at 1380 (noting some states bar “an agency from
promulgating standards or regulations more stringent than federal law unless
unique circumstances justify more stringent reuglaitons”).
114

41

Adler – When Is Two A Crowd?

DRAFT – Not for Citation

Figure 2

QFReg

A

B

C

The net effect of such signaling is represented in Figure 2
above. States A and B have regulatory standards (QAReg and QBReg,
respectively) less stringent than the federal standard (QFReg). State
C, on the other hand, has a regulatory standard (QCReg) greater than
the relevant federal standard. Adoption of the federal regulatory
standard increases the aggregate level of regulation by a quantity
equal to the sum of the difference between the federal standard and
the lower state standards ((QFReg - QAReg ) + (QFReg - QBReg)). The
net effect of the federal standard may be lower than this, however.
If State C adopts a law prohibiting state standards that exceed
relevant federal requirements, the aggregate level of regulation will
be reduced by the amount to which State C’s standard exceeded
the federal standard (QCReg - QFReg). Thus, the net effect of the
federal standard will be the extent to which the increase in
regulation in States A and B exceeds the reduction in State C
((QFReg - QAReg ) + (QFReg - QBReg) - (QCReg - QFReg). In the unlikely
event that the reduction in regulation in State C exceeds the
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increase in regulation in States A and B, the adoption of a federal
standard could actually result in a net reduction in the aggregate
level of regulation.
There are other reasons to be concerned about a signaling
effect. Insofar as federal standards are not based upon accurate,
up-to-date scientific assessments of environmental problems,115
and such information is not available to state and local
policymakers, the federal regulation may have an even greater
distorting effect on state priorities. Such laws may also serve to
shift effective control over environmental priorities from the state
to federal level.116 Of course, to the extent federal policymakers
are likely to adopt quantitatively or qualitatively superior
regulatory standards, the signaling effect may have a positive
effect on regulatory policy. There could be additional welfare
benefits from a signaling effect to the extent it reduces regulatory
variability across states.117
The importance of signaling is not that it necessarily results
in less optimal regulation. Rather, the primary importance of the
signaling effect is that it is likely to reduce the net benefits
provided by the adoption of a federal regulatory standard. Taking
this indirect effect of federal regulation on state regulatory choices
into account is likely to improve the quality of environmental
policymaking.
2. Crowding Out
A second potential negative indirect effect of federal
regulation on state regulatory choices is “crowding out.” This
occurs because federal regulation may serve as a substitute for
state-level regulation, and thereby reduce the benefits of adopting
or maintaining state-level protections. Insofar as voters in a given
115

See Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10, at ___ (noting inadequate
understanding of environmental problems covered by various federal programs).
116
See Organ, supra note 106, at 1387.
117
See Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10
, at ___ (noting potential
benefits from economies of scale generated by regulatory uniformity).
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state demand a certain level of environmental protection, there is
no reason to expect states to duplicate federal efforts insofar as a
federal program is satisfying that demand, particularly if a state has
not already created such a program. If the federal “floor” is greater
than or equal to the level of environmental protection demanded by
a state’s residents, there is no reason for a state to adopt
environmental regulations of its own once the federal government
has acted. Insofar as this effect occurs, it is separate from –
perhaps even in addition to – the signaling effect described above.
The claim here is not simply that states regulate less than
they would absent federal regulation – although this claim is
almost certainly true. Rather, the claim here is that there may be
some states that, absent the imposition of federal regulations,
would adopt regulations more protective than the federal floor, but
due to federal regulation, have not done so, and may not do so in
the future either. If this hypothesis is correct, then it is possible
that, at least in some states, the net effect of federal environmental
regulations could be less environmental protection than would
have been adopted had the federal government not intervened.
To see how this could occur, consider first that the demand
for environmental regulation in any given jurisdiction will tend to
increase over time as wealth, technical capability, scientific
knowledge, and environmental impacts increase.118 In any given
state (as in the nation as a whole), there is an initial period (“Period
A”) during which the demand for a given type of environmental
protection is relatively low. The costs of adopting environmental
regulations in this period are greater than the benefits to be derived
from adopting any such protections. These costs include the costs
of developing, drafting, and passing legislation, the costs of
creating a new policy program, drafting and implementing
regulations, defending the regulations from any potential legal or
administrative challenges, creating a means to monitor and enforce
regulatory compliance, and so on, in addition to the opportunity

118

See infra Part I.A.
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costs of devoting state resources and political capital to the cause
of environmental protection as opposed to some other policy goal.
As discussed earlier, the demand for environmental
protection has tended to increase over time along with increases in
living standards.119 At the same time, increases in technical
knowledge and administrative efficiency may also lower the costs
of a given regulatory program. Eventually, a state will enter a
second period (“Period B”) in which the benefits of a given
environmental regulatory program are greater than the costs of
initiating, implementing and operating such a program. Absent
any federal interference, the hypothetical state will not adopt
environmental regulations in Period A, but will adopt such
regulations in Period B. (See Figure 3) This is the environmental
transition discussed in Part I. In Period A, the demand for
environmental protection is insufficient to justify the costs of
implementing environmental protection measures. By Period B,
however, the demand for environmental protection has risen due to
increases in wealth and knowledge, among other factors. At the
same time, increases in technical capacity and scientific
understanding have reduced the cost of adopting environmental
protections. As a result, in Period B a state will adopt QB amount
of environmental protection.120

119

See infra Part I.A.
Environmental protections can be evaluated in both quantitative and
qualitative terms. This initial discussion focuses exclusively on the quantity of
environmental protection. The effect of qualitative differences in environmental
protection are discussed below. See infra Part IV.
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Figure 3
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The timing of Period A and Period B will vary from state to
state. This is clearly the case as different states have adopted
different environmental regulatory measures at different times –
some before the adoption of federal environmental regulation,
some after, and some not at all. Looking at the history of various
environmental concerns, such as air quality, water quality, or
wetlands, it is clear that many states moved from Period A to
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Period B for these environmental concerns at various times prior to
the onset of federal regulations in the 1970s. In many other states,
however, a federal regulatory floor was adopted before the onset of
Period B.
For states that went through their environmental transition,
prior to the enactment of federal environmental protection, whether
the adoption of a federal regulatory floor increased the aggregate
level of environmental protection in that state depended upon
whether pre-existing state policies offered greater or lesser levels
of protection than the relevant federal rules. For states in which
the onset of Period B begins after the adoption of federal
regulations, the enactment of a federal regulatory floor will, at the
time of enactment, increase the aggregate level of environmental
protection in that state. But this may not be the case over time. In
states that develop desire a greater level of protection than that
provided by the relevant federal regulations, it is not clear that the
existence of the federal regulatory floor will result in an equal or
greater level of protection than would be adopted were it not for
the federal regulations. This is because federal regulation will, to
some extent, act as a substitute for state regulation. As a result, the
adoption of federal regulation has the potential to reduce the
demand for state regulation and, in some instances, even result in
less aggregate regulation in a given state than would have been
adopted absent federal intervention. In short, federal regulation
can crowd out state regulation.
The potential for such a crowding out effect is illustrated
in Figure 4. The existence of federal regulation will reduce the
demand for state regulation by an amount equal to the extent to
which federal regulation is a substitute for state regulation of the
same environmental concern (QFReg). This substitution effect will
reduce the net benefit of adopting state-level environmental
regulations from OCQB to OC’Q’B. By reducing the net benefits
of state-level environmental regulation in this manner, federal
regulation has the potential to crowd out state-level environmental
protections, even if the quantity of environmental protection
demanded in the state is greater than that provided by the federal
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government. In such cases, the aggregate level of environmental
protection will be lower with federal regulation than it would be
without it.
Figure 4
B
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QFReg

DB

D'B

A

C

C'
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A key assumption in this analysis is that there are
significant fixed costs to the adoption of environmental protections
(or, for that matter, any regulatory program). In some states, the
additional benefits of adopting more stringent regulations on top of
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the federal requirements will more than offset the costs of adopting
the new program. In these states the fixed costs of creating a
program plus the operating costs are less than the expected
marginal benefits from the additional margins of regulation.
However, it seems likely that there are at least some states in
which the aggregate net benefits of regulation at a level more
protective than the federal standard are greater than the costs of
such regulation absent federal regulation, but that the net benefits
of additional regulation above and beyond the federal floor are less
than the costs of adopting such additional regulations. In other
words, if in a given state the net benefits of adopting state
regulations alone (OCQB) are greater than the costs of adopting
such regulations (CReg), but the net benefits of adopting such
regulations given federal regulations are already in place (OC’Q’B)
are less than CReg, then the presence of a federal regulatory floor
will produce a lower level of environmental protection than were
that floor not to exist.121
In this latter situation, one would not expect the state to
regulate, even though the amount of regulation demanded in the
given state is greater than that provided by the federal government.
While federal regulation creates a floor, raising the regulatory
baseline, it does not reduce the fixed costs of policy change. (If
anything, it may increase the opportunity costs for state
policymakers who devote their political capital to the
environmental resource at issue rather than another environmental
concern in which the federal government is not active.) Federal
regulation does, however, reduce the benefits of state regulation,
and may do so significantly.
This theory is based on several premises and observations
about the political economy of policymaking. First, environmental
regulation, like most forms of regulation or other government
action, experience diminishing marginal benefits and increasing
marginal costs. That is, the marginal environmental gains from
121

Put in formulaic terms, for states in which OCQB > CReg but CReg >
OC’Q’B , the presence of a federal regulatory floor will result in a lower level of
environmental protection.
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each additional increment of regulation will tend to be less than the
gains from the preceding increment. Thus, when the federal
government establishes a floor, it has likely displaced those state
efforts that would be most cost-beneficial. (This has the effect of
shifting the demand curve for state regulation to the left, reducing
the net benefits of state regulation.)
Second, the political process imposes substantial
transaction costs on the creation of (or elimination of) new
government programs, and these costs are relatively fixed such that
they do not vary with the size of the program in question. The
most obvious example of such transaction costs is the existence of
so-called “vetogates” that determined minority interests can use to
prevent the adoption of policies that enjoy majority support.122
The existence of these “vetogates”123 means that many policy
changes must have supermajority support before they are enacted –
or at the very least require the expenditure of substantial amounts
of political capital by their proponents (as a means of purchasing
supermajority support).124 The fragmentation of policy-making
authority across branches of government adds to the difficulty of
adopting new policies. The obstacles also may be particularly
large in highly complex policy areas like environmental
protection.125

122

See McNollgast, supra note 105, at 11 (observing that because “attempts to
pass new legislation typically must navigate through numerous veto gates . . . it
is difficult and time-consuming to change most prior legislative bargains.”).
123
William Eskridge defines a “vetogate” as “a place within a process where a
statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed.” William N. Eskridge Jr.,
Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Construction, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
671, 677n13 (1999).
124
McNollgast, supra note 105, at 16 (noting “the basic structure of government
establishes several checks on the ability of legislative majorities to enact their
will”).
125
LAZARUS, supra note 65, at 32 (noting the “strong structural bias within our
existing lawmaking institutions in favor of government’s acting more slowly and
incrementally”). While Lazarus comments are directed at the national
government, this same structural bias can be seen in state governments as well.
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Third, policymakers are, to some extent, utility maximizers
such that, all else equal, they will invest in policies that provide the
greatest benefits and lowest costs to them.126 Insofar as state
policymakers “share” responsibility for some environmental
concerns with their federal counterparts, it may be difficult for
them to secure the benefits of their efforts.127 Relatedly,
information about the relative activities of the federal and state
governments and their relative merits is costly to the average voter
where both the state and federal governments are active, so it may
be difficult for policymakers to get credit for all of the policies
they promote or implement.128 This is one reason why some argue
that cooperative federalism undermines accountability. When both
126

The utility maximized by the policymaker need not be the policymaker’s
“self-interest” but could also be the “public interest” that the policymaker seeks
to serve. See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, and Robert N. Stavins,
The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 333 (1998) (observing legislator may derive utility from
many different interests). Alternate assumptions do not alter the analysis.
Indeed, as Jonathan Macey observes,
over a wide range of issues, the outcomes predicted by the publicinterest model will be identical to those predicted by the interest-group
model when the political-support-maximizing solution varies widely
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators ad the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76
VA. L. REV. 265, 284 (1990). See also Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, &
Andrew Dorchak, Coosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179,
214-223 (2005) (summarizing various theories of regulation); Daniel A. Farber,
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 62-70
(1981) (same)
127
See Buzbee, supra note 91
, at 27 -28 (noting policymakers may view
“regulatory opportunity as a commons resource much as fishers would view a
shared ocean,” resulting in regulatory inattention).
128
See Macey, supra note 126, at 275 (noting division of authority between
federal and state governments can enable Congress to “shift the blame for
controversial enactments even more effectively . . . than by deferring to
administrative agencies”); Buzbee, supra note 91, at 31 (“Where numerous
regulators could be blamed for the ill, or sought out for relief, demanders of
regulation encounter substantial informational and strategic hurdles confounding
attribution decisions”).

51

Adler – When Is Two A Crowd?

DRAFT – Not for Citation

the federal government and the states are involved, it is more
difficult for a voter to know who to credit or blame for a given
policy.129 Because it is easier for a state policy maker to get credit
for a policy when the state does not compete with the federal
government in the provision of that policy goal, all else equal a
state policy maker will prefer to legislate where the federal
government is less active.
One implication of the crowding out effect is that it is
possible that the adoption of a federal regulatory floor may result
in lower levels of regulatory protection than had the federal
government not entered the field. This potential is illustrated in
Figure 5 below. As in Figure 2, which illustrated the signaling
effect, States A and B initially have regulatory standards (QAReg
and QBReg, respectively) less stringent than the federal standard
(QFReg), while State C has a regulatory standard (QCReg) greater
than the relevant federal standard. Here, however, the demand for
environmental regulation in each state is not static. Rather, the
demand for regulation in State B is increasing over time. Absent
federal regulation, State B would eventually adopt a higher level of
protection – a level of protection greater than that which would be
adopted at the federal level. In this scenario, the adoption of a
federal standard not only has the potential to signal to states to
reduce their levels of protection. It may also discourage the
adoption of ever greater levels of protection in those states that go
through their environmental transition after the adoption of the
federal standard. This potential opportunity cost of federal
regulation is no less important than the more observable effects
illustrated in Figure 2.

129

See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L. REV.
557 (2000); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 828 (1998) (noting
“accountability” argument for anti-commandeering rule, insofar as it is
accepted, applies with equal force to “cooperative federalism” arrangements).
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Figure 5

QFReg

A

B

C

When the crowding out effect is combined with the
signaling effect discussed above, the likelihood that federal
regulation could result in a net decline in the aggregate level of
regulatory protection increases. As before, adoption of the federal
regulatory standard increases the aggregate level of regulation by
quantity equal to the sum of the difference between the federal
standard and the lower state standards. The net benefits of the
federal standard at any given point in time is this amount (QFReg QAReg ), less any reduction due to signaling (QCReg - QFReg), and the
extent to which State B would have regulated absent federal action
(QBReg - QFReg). Here the net effect of the federal standard will be
the extent to which the increase in regulation in State A varies
from the reduction in State C and regulation foregone in State B.
Stated as a forumla: (QFReg - QAReg ) – [(QBReg - QFReg) + (QCReg QFReg)].
Even if the adoption of federal regulation initially increased
the aggregate level of regulatory protection, over time the level of
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protection may be less than they would otherwise have been. Over
time, as more states go through their environmental transitions, the
magnitude of this crowding effect could increase, unless federal
regulatory standards are able to keep pace. Given the slow rate at
which existing federal regulatory programs are reviewed and
expanded, however, this would seem to be a questionable
assumption.

IV.

QUALITATIVE VS. QUANTITATIVE PROTECTION

Up until this point, this paper has discussed environmental
protection in a two-dimensional fashion, focusing on quantitative
changes in regulatory protection. This vastly over simplifies the
relevant analysis, as various regulatory programs will vary in both
quantitative and qualitative terms.130 Two programs that appear to
adopt the same quantitative level of environmental protection, such
as the same ambient standard or emission limit, and yet vary quite
significantly in cost, effectiveness, equitableness, and other factors.
Conversely, two programs that adopt superficially disparate goals
may, in fact, offer qualitatively similar environmental protection.
For these reasons, any complete analysis must acknowledge that
environmental measures vary in both qualitative and quantitative
ways.
There are several factors that may cause state-level
environmental regulations to be more cost-effective, or otherwise
qualitatively superior, than federal regulations of equivalent cost or
scope.131 First, and perhaps most important, state policymakers
and regulators may have access to knowledge of local problems
130

See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, and Robert N. Stavins, The
Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 313, 313 (1998) (noting design of environmental policy requires
determining both the desired level of environmental protection and what policy
instruments should be used to achieve the specific environmental goal).
131
See generally TESKE, supra note 9, at 23 (summarizing potential advantages
of state regulation).
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and conditions.132 Consideration of such knowledge in the
development and implementation of state regulatory programs may
increase the protectiveness of existing programs without increasing
their cost or scope. Second, and related, state policymakers, by
virtue of the fact that they are closer both to the environmental
problems they seek to address and the regulated community may
be more responsive to local needs and concerns. Third, insofar as
environmental problems vary from place to place, state
policymakers may be able to focus state resources on
environmental problems that exist in a given state. Federal
standards, on the other hand, tend to impose broad one-size-fits-all
requirements that, in actuality, often fit no state particularly
well.133 A regulatory requirement that makes perfect sense in one
state may not provide much environmental protection in another.
Fourth, the existence of a federal standard may inhibit the ability of
(or incentive for) state policymakers to innovate or experiment
with different approaches to meeting a given environmental
goal.134
There is empirical evidence that, at least in some areas,
state regulation may do a better job of addressing local
environmental concerns in a cost-effective manner. Several states
clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites at lower cost and more
rapidly than the federal Superfund program.135 Similarly, federal
132

See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
See Dwyer, supra note 4, at 222 (“The sheer size of the nation and the
dizzying variety of social and environmental conditions and political preferences
leave little hope that the central government could efficiently or accurately
custom tailor environmental laws for different regions.”).
134
On state innovation generally, see ALEXANDER VOLOKH, ET AL., NAT’L
ENVTL. POLICY INST. & REASON PUB. POLICY INST., RACE TO THE TOP: THE
INNOVATIVE FACE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1998); see also
Richard L. Revsez, Federalism and Environmental Policy: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 53, 636 (2001) (“[T]he states, not the federal
government, produced the most innovation in pollution contorl legislation in the
1990s.”).
135
See Richard L. Revsez, Federalism and Environmental Policy: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 53, 603 (2001) (noting state leadership in
waste site clean up and brownfield redevelopment).
133
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regulations may hinder the adoption of more effective pollution
control or resource conservation strategies, and that state
policymakers would be more sensitive to such concerns. The
federal Clean Air Act requires many states to adopt suboptimal
pollution control strategies when equally stringent – but differently
targeted – measures would produce greater results.136 In the
wetlands context, states took the lead in evaluating wetland
functions and incorporating the ecological value of particular
wetlands into the regulatory process when there was no evidence
similar considerations entered the federal permitting process.137 In
other words, at a given level of stringency, some states were
beginning to incorporate ecological consideration so as to
maximize the environmental value of regulations on wetland
development when the federal government was doing no such
thing.
States need not regulate “more” than the federal
government to provide greater levels of environmental protection.
Better regulation – that is environmental protection measures that
are qualitatively different – may be sufficient in some instances to
improve the level of environmental protection. Insofar as federal
regulation encourages states to adopt a particular approach to
environmental protection, or discourages states from adopting
programs more suited to specific state conditions, it can reduce
aggregate environmental protection.
Just as the federal
136

See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 462-63.
For instance, as of 1992 ten states were using wetland classification systems
to evaluate function and value in the regulatory process. William E. Taylor &
Dennis Magee, Should All Wetlands Be Subject to the Same Regulation? 7 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 32, 34 (1992). The development of these sorts of
programs is important because "[a]bsent regulatory classification, there is a
presumption that all wetlands are of equal significance with respect to functional
value, and that no distinctions are necessary in the level of regulation or in
designating mitigation requirements." Id. at 32. On the other hand, a review of
Corps permitting decisions found no evidence such considerations entered into
the regulatory process. See Michael J. Mortimer, Irregular Regulation Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Is the Congress or the Army Corps of
Engineers to Blame? 13 J. ENV. L. & LITIG. 445 (1998).
137
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government’s regulatory programs discourage more extensive state
regulatory efforts, these programs may also discourage the
adoption of qualitatively preferable state level programs that may
differ more in kind than in their degree of stringency.
Much of the discussion has also operated under the
assumption that a greater quantity or stringency of regulation is
necessarily more optimal. While this assumption is common in the
environmental literature, it is also an over-simplification. Overregulation, in the form of excessively stringent or overly-enforced
regulatory requirements, is just as possible as under-regulation.
The most welfare enhancing regulatory regime is that which comes
closest to the optimal level of environmental regulation, not
necessarily that which produces the greatest level or regulation.

V.

CASE STUDY: WETLANDS

The “cooperative federalism” model implemented in most
federal environmental programs complicates the observation of
indirect effects due to the existence of inducement measures to
encourage state regulation. Wetlands regulation may be one
context in which the indirect effects of federal regulation on state
policy choices may be observed, however, and perhaps even
empirically tested. Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the
federal government regulates the filling and modification of
wetlands directly. States receive little inducement to regulate in
the federal government’s stead.138 Wetland regulation is one area
in which the state regulatory choices are largely free from direct
federal influence.139 For this reason, it may be easier to isolate and
assess the extent to which non-preemptive federal regulation is
having the sorts of indirect effects on state regulatory decision-

138

Only two states, Michigan and New Jersey, have delegated authority to
administer wetlands regulations in lieu of the federal government.
139
The primary exception is federal funding for state coastal zone management
programs which may include regulations of coastal wetlands.
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making discussed in Part III in the context of wetland regulation
than in other areas.
Several states began to regulate the modification of
wetlands well before the federal government. Massachusetts
became the first state to enact wetland regulations in 1963 with the
adoption of a statute requiring a state-issued permit for the
dredging or filling of coastal wetlands.140 This statute was based
upon preexisting zoning requirements adopted by local
governments in several coastal states.141 Two years later the
Massachusetts legislature extended the statute to cover inland
wetlands as well. Other states shortly followed suit, including
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia and Washington.142 By 1975,
when federal regulation of wetlands began, every coastal state in
the lower 48 states save Texas had adopted wetland regulations of
some kind.143
Congress enacted the CWA, formally known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, in 1972. The CWA prohibits the
“discharge of any pollutant,” including rock, sand, or dredged
material, into “navigable waters” of the United States without a
federal permit.144 “Navigable waters” are defined as “waters of the
United States,”145 which has been interpreted to include all
navigable and nonnavigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands
the use of which could impact interstate commerce.146 Section 404
authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits “for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters,”
140

Alexandra D. Dawson, Massachusetts' Experience in Regulating Wetlands, in
ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, WETLAND PROTECTION:
STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE STATES 255 (1985).
141
Id.
142
This history is recounted in Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the
Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of
Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENV. L. 1, 47-54 (1999).
143
JON A. KUSLER ET AL., STATE WETLAND REGULATIONS: STATUS OF
PROGRAMS AND EMERGING TRENDS 1 (1994).
144
33 U.S.C. §1311(a).
145
33 U.S.C. §1362(7).
146
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
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subject to a veto by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).147
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not initially
interpret the CWA to require Section 404 permits for the filling of
wetlands.148
Environmental groups disagreed with this
interpretation and sued the Army Corps in federal court.149 The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected
the Corps’ interpretation of the Act, holding that Congress, in
passing the CWA, “asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's
waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution,” including wetlands and other nonnavigable waters.150 While there seemed to be a substantial
amount of state regulatory activity prior to the onset of federal
wetland regulation, after the federal government began regulating
wetlands in 1975, the rate at which non-regulating states adopted
new wetland regulations appears to have slowed. States that had
yet to adopt wetland protections by 1975 had yet to go through
their environmental transition with regard to wetlands, it is
possible that at least some of these states went through their
transition some time after 1975, however. Were it not for the
adoption of federal regulation, these states may have adopted
wetland regulations in the intervening years. Such legislation
could well have been discouraged or delayed – or “crowded out””
– due to the presence of federal regulations.
Of note, all fourteen states in the continental U.S. with
more than ten percent of their land area in wetlands according to
the National Wetland Inventory adopted wetland protection
measures prior to 1975.151 As one review of state wetland
147

33 U.S.C. §1344(a), (c).
See 531 U.S. at 168 (citing Corps’ 1974 regulation).
149
The Environmental Protection Agency also disagreed with the Army Corps’
initial statutory interpretation.
150
NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
151
See JON A. KUSLER, ET AL., ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS,
STATE WETLAND REGULATION: STATUTE OF PROGRAMS AND TRENDS, at 5-8,
tbl. 1. The states in question are Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
148
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regulations noted, “most of the states with the largest wetland
acreages have adopted wetland regulatory efforts for all or a
portion of their wetlands.”152 Although the adoption of such
measures can entail significant costs, the states with the most
wetlands clearly determined that the value of protecting wetlands
was greater than the attendant costs of regulating them, interstate
competitive pressures notwithstanding. This pattern is the exact
opposite of what some scholars had predicted.153 It is also
significant that those states that regulated before the federal
government tend to have more extensive regulatory protections
than do those states that acted later.
A potential explanation for this history of state wetland
regulation is that those states with the most wetlands were, by and
large, the first states to go through the environmental transition
with regard to wetlands. Under this hypothesis, states with a large
percentage of their land area in wetlands were the first to recognize
the tremendous ecological and economic benefits that wetlands can
provide, including flood control, water filtration, species habitat,
and the like. As these states went through the environmental
transition, the demand for wetland protection increased until the
benefits of adopting such measures was greater than the costs. The
presence of federal regulation, however, reduced the value of state
wetland regulations to the extent that federal regulation served as a
substitute for state regulation. Because of the fixed costs involved
with the adoption of a new wetland regulatory program, the net
effect would be greater than just the substitution effect, so that
states that went through the environmental transition with regard to
wetlands after 1975 may not have adopted wetland regulations of
their own, even if the state regulations would have been more
protective than the federal rules. Where states did subsequently
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.
152
Id. at 3.
153
See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands
Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and
Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1253 (1995)..
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adopt wetland regulations, due to the crowding out effect the
regulations may have been adopted significantly later than they
would have absent the federal rules.
The history of wetland regulations may also provide
evidence of how federal policy-making may encourage the
adoption of environmental policies at the state level. While
Massachusetts and some other states recognized the value of
protecting their wetland resources before the federal government
did, many other states adopted their first regulatory measures after
the importance of wetland protection was recognized at the federal
level.
Federal consideration and eventual passage of the Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA)154 may have influenced state
policymakers as well, particularly in coastal states. A national
discussion on the importance of protecting coastal resources could
have increased the salience of coastal zone protection at the state
level. The protection of wetlands is one of the specific policy
goals explicitly referenced in the act.155 Passage of the CZMA
may have further encouraged state-level protection of coastal
wetlands insofar as the CZMA authorizes federal funding of state
coastal zone programs.
Contemporary developments in wetland protection at the
federal and state level may provide further insight into the effect
federal regulatory decisions have on state environmental policies.
In 2001, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),156 the Supreme Court
narrowed the scope of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Specifically,
the Court held that the CWA does not confer federal regulatory
jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters, including isolated
wetlands.157 Initial reactions to the SWANCC holding predicted

154

16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465.
16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(A).
156
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
157
531 U.S. at 173.
155
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substantial negative effects on wetland protection efforts
nationwide.158
While the initial response to the SWANCC decision as
alarm, the actual effect of the decision became was muddied rather
quickly.159 A Joint Memorandum issued by the Army Corps and
EPA in January 2003 prohibited the assertion of regulatory
jurisdiction over isolated waters based upon the presence of
migratory birds alone, but did not provide much additional
guidance.160 At the same time, the two agencies proposed to
clarify the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA through
a rulemaking.161 This effort was soon abandoned due to extensive
criticism from environmentalist organizations.162 In the meantime,
158

See, e.g., Lance D. Wood, Do Not Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to
All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the Traditional Navigable Waters and to Their
Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10187, 10189, 10195 (2004) (noting
“potentially disastrous” and “catastrophic” effects). Writing n dissent, Justice
Stevens also predicted dire consequences from the Court’s decision to
“needlessly weaken[] our principal safeguard against toxic water.” 531 U.S., at
__ (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159
See, e.g., Lance D. Wood, Do Not Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to
All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the Traditional Navigable Waters and to Their
Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10187, 10189, 10189 (2004) (noting
SWANCC was “ambiguous” and courts have been “inconsistent” in their
interpretations); Amended Statement of Patrick Parenteau, Professor of Law,
Vermont Law School, before the House of Representatives Committee on
Government Reform, Sept. 19, 2002 (“The decision has created substantial
uncertainty regarding the geographic jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.”);
Position Paper on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Determinations Pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s January 9, 2001 Decision, Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Associate of State Wetland
Managers, Dec. 2001 (“The section 404 regulatory program has been in turmoil
ever since the Supreme Court’s SWANCC decision.”).
160
Id. at 1995, Appendix A.
161
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003).
162
See Eric Pianin, EPA Scraps Changes To Clean Water Act; Plans Would
Have Reduced Protection, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A20. One reason
given by the Army Corps and EPA to forego the rule-making was that federal
courts had narrowly interpreted SWANCC’s impact. Ironically, on the same day
as the Army Corps/EPA announcement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
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federal implementation of the holding has been inconsistent.163 A
study by the General Accounting Office found that Army Corps
district offices’ jurisdictional determinations have varied
significantly since SWANCC.164 In the courts, there is already a
circuit split on the scope of the holding.165 Most circuits have
adopted a fairly narrow reading of SWANCC, though the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has interpreted SWANCC to
impose potentially significant limits on federal regulatory authority
under the CWA.166
As state policy makers are more likely to adopt new
environmental measures where the net benefits from such actions
are greatest – and they are most likely to receive credit for their
efforts – the modest interpretation of SWANCC, as well as the
continued uncertainty as to the scope of post-SWANCC federal
regulatory authority, would discourage additional state action.167
The benefits of additional state regulation, and the extent to which
Circuit held that such narrow interpretations of SWANCC were “unsustainable.”
See Daniel Simmons, Navigating SWANCC: An Examination of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers’ Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 43 ENVTL. L. REP.
10723, 10730 (2004) (citing In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003).
163
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Waters and Wetlands: Corps of
Engineers Needs to Evaluate Its District Office Practices in Determining
Jurisdiction, GAO-04-297, Feb. 2004, at 3 (“Corps districts differ in how they
interpret and apply the federal regulations when determining what wetlands and
other waters fall within the jurisdiction of the federal government”).
164
Id. at 3 (“Corps districts differ in how they interpret and apply the federal
regulations when determining what wetlands and other waters fall within the
jurisdiction of the federal government”).
165
At the time of this writing, there is a circuit split as to the extent of federal
jurisdiction under the CWA post-SWANCC. See, e.g., United States v. Deaton,
332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (interpreting SWANCC narrowly); United States v.
Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Rueth Dev. Co.,
335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003)(same); compare In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th
Cir. 2003) (after SWANCC federal jurisdiction only extends to wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters); Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir.
2001) (same).
166
See Needham, 354 F.3d; Rice, 250 F.3d.
167
See Buzbee, supra note 91
, at 14 (noting “uncertain regulatory turf creates
both demand and supply-side incentives for regulatory inattention”).
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state policy makers will be able to take credit for protecting
isolated waters is uncertain, so the value of such measures will be
discounted accordingly. It is also possible that the reluctance of
states to adopt additional wetland protections reflects nothing more
than a lack of demand for such protections in those states that have
yet to adopt measures covering isolated wetlands. Nonetheless,
shortly after SWANCC, many states considered, and some adopted,
additional regulatory measures to fill the gaps potentially left by
the decision.168 Insofar as the Supreme Court resolves any
lingering ambiguity about the scope of federal jurisdiction after
SWANCC in currently pending cases, it will be important to see
how states respond.
The history of wetlands regulation is far from conclusive.
While it provides evidence that federal actions can both directly
and indirectly encourage the adoption of state-level environmental
measures, it does not prove that federal regulations crowded out
state wetland protections. One can only surmise the details of such
a counterfactual scenario.169 The pattern of wetland regulation is
nonetheless consistent with the crowding out theory. This
narrative suggests the need for empirical examination into the
168

According to Professor Michael Gerhardt:
at least 19 states have responded to the decision by either enacting or
recommending the enactment of laws to fill the void left by the Court’s
decision. These states include, inter alia, California, Connecticut,
Illinois, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. These reactions are a clear illustration of
environmental federalism in action.
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Curious Flight of the Migratory Bird Rule, 31 ENVTL.
L. REP. 11079, 11085 (2001). The state of Ohio, for example, enacted an
“emergency measure” to extend state regulations to isolated wetlands in July
2001, only a few months after the SWANCC decision. 2001 Ohio H.B. 231. See
also, C. Victor Pyle III, Isolated Wetlands Jurisprudence Post-SWANCC and
Resulting Federal and State Attempts to Fill the Void, 11 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL
L.J. 91, 101-106 (2002) (summarizing initial state-level responses); Jan
Goldman-Carter, Isolated Wetland Legislation: Running the Rapids at the State
Capitol, NATL WETLANDS NEWSLETTER, May-June 2005, at 27 (same).
169
See generally, Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . .: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339 (1992).
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determinants of state wetland regulation that seeks to account for,
and measure, the extent to which any crowding effect can be
observed.
CONCLUSION
Both the federal and state governments have an integral
role to play in environmental protection. If each is to play an
optimal role, however, there must be greater consideration of how
the various levels of government interact. In particular, there must
be greater consideration of how federal regulatory decisions may
enhance or undermine complementary efforts at the state level.
Even where federal regulation is absolutely necessary, it
establishing the optimal level of environmental protection requires
consideration of how such regulations will effect state-level policy
making. In some cases, the adoption of a federal regulatory floor
will enhance state efforts. In other cases, it will not. Indeed, in
some instances, increased federal environmental efforts may
produce less environmental protection. This finding is important
because it challenges the prevailing yet heretofore unexamined
assumption that the adoption of federal regulatory floors ensures a
maintenance or increase in levels of environmental protection from
that which would be observed absent federal involvement. The
precise extent of federal influence on state regulatory policy
requires further empirical examination. In the meantime, greater
attention to these influences could further facilitate the
development of more effective and protective environmental
measures.
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